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This paper reports on the findings from a major international research project 
investigating the poverty impacts of a potential Doha Development Agenda. It combines 
in a novel way the results from several strands of research. Firstly, it draws on an 
intensive analysis of the DDA Framework Agreement, with particularly close attention 
paid to potential reforms in agriculture. The scenarios are built up using newly available 
tariff line data and their implications for world markets are established using a global 
modeling framework. These world trade impacts, in turn, form the basis for twelve 
country case studies of the national poverty impacts of these DDA scenarios. The focus 
countries include: Bangladesh, Brazil (2 studies), Cameroon, China (2 studies), 
Indonesia, Mexico, Mozambique, Philippines, Russia, and Zambia. The diversity of 
approaches taken in these studies allows them to stress local conditions and priorities and 
illustrates a wide range of facets of the trade-poverty links. It does, however, limit the 
ability to draw broader conclusions. Thus an additional study which provides a 15 
country cross-section analysis is aimed at this objective, and a global analysis provides 
estimates for the world as a whole.  
 
A few of the main findings follow: 
 
•  The liberalization targets under the DDA have to quite ambitious if the round is to 
have a measurable impact on world markets and hence poverty. 
•  Assuming an ambitious DDA, we find the near-term poverty impacts to be mixed; 
some countries experience small poverty rises and others more substantial poverty 
declines. On balance, poverty is reduced under this DDA, and this reduction is 
more pronounced in the longer run. 
•  Allowing minimal tariff cuts for just a small percentage of special and sensitive 
products virtually eliminates the global poverty reduction due to the DDA. 
•  Deeper cuts in developing country tariffs would make the DDA more poverty 
friendly. 
•  Key determinants of the national poverty impacts include: the incomplete 
transmission of world prices to rural households, barriers to the mobility of 
workers between sectors of the economy, as well as the incidence of national tax 
instruments used to replace lost tariff revenue. 
•  In order to generate significant poverty reductions in the near term, 
complementary domestic reforms are required to enable households to take 
advantage of new market opportunities made available through the DDA.  
•  Sustained long term poverty reductions depend on stimulating economic growth. 
Here, the impact of the DDA (and trade policy more generally) on productivity is 
critical. In order to fully realize their growth potential, trade reforms need to be 
far reaching, addressing barriers to services trade and investment in addition to 
merchandise tariffs. Introduction and Motivation 
International trade is arguably the most direct economic means by which rich 
countries influence poor countries.  Exports of manufactures by developing countries 
have increased rapidly over the last 30 years, due in part to falling tariffs in the OECD as 
well as in developing countries, declining transport costs, increased specialization, and 
sustained economic growth.  Whereas manufactures accounted for just 25% of 
developing country exports in 1965, this share subsequently tripled to nearly 75% over 
the next three decades, while agriculture’s share of developing country exports has fallen 
from 50% to under 10% (Hertel and Martin, 2000).  Increased manufactures trade has 
benefited many developing countries, helping them make the transition out of agriculture, 
and lifting many out of poverty.   
Some of the poorest developing countries, however, have gained relatively little 
from increased manufactures trade. Market access for their most competitive 
manufactured export remains highly restricted (apparel), as it does for their key source of 
employment and exports, farming, and the problem with agricultural exports is 
exacerbated by the massive government subsidies provided to OECD farmers.  Turning 
to poverty within the poorest countries, developed-country agricultural policies become 
even more central.  A majority of the poor are concentrated in rural areas, where 
agriculture is usually the main source of economic activity (World Bank, 2004),  and in 
the poorest developing countries, large shares of households (including most of the very 
poorest) depend on self-employment in agriculture for virtually all of their income 
(Hertel et al., 2004b).  Together, these facts highlight the potential influence that 
multilateral trade policies can have on poverty in developing countries.    4
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations, sponsored by the World 
Trade Organization, experienced a blow in Cancun, Mexico, precisely over the question 
of rich country agricultural support and its potential impacts on poverty in developing 
countries.  The Doha negotiations are now emphasizing the need to better understand the 
linkages between trade policies – particularly in rich countries – and poverty in the 
developing world.  Moreover, poverty reduction is now widely accepted as a central 
focus for development efforts and has become the main mission of the World Bank and 
other development institutions.  For example, the “Millennium Development Goals” 
commit the international community to halve poverty by 2015, and locate several key 
means to this goal in international trade.  
With this high level of policy interest, it is hardly surprising that the issue of trade 
and developing-country poverty has become a focus of much research activity over the 
last several years.  This paper summarizes a research program that offers the first 
comprehensive analysis of the national poverty impacts of specific policy reforms 
proposed under the auspices of the WTO.
1 It combines the results from several strands of 
research in a novel way. First, it draws on an intensive analysis of the July 2004 DDA 
Framework Agreement, particularly of potential reforms in agriculture, which, as we 
shall see, have special significance to the poor. The scenarios analyzed below are built up 
from newly available tariff line data on bound and applied tariff rates. Similarly detailed 
analysis is undertaken in the case of domestic support for agriculture and export 
subsidies, as well as for non-agricultural market access.   
                                                 
1 Most of the studies in the program are included in the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper series. 
All are available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/poverty   5
Second, the research assesses the implications of these alternative Doha scenarios 
for world markets. These are established using a state-of-the-art, global modeling 
framework which incorporates the most recent econometric evidence on supply and 
demand elasticities – with particularly close attention paid to food and agriculture 
markets which prove crucial in assessing the poverty impacts of the DDA. The outputs of 
this part of the project include export and import price changes for each region of the 
world, along with changes in export volumes. 
Third, these world trade impacts form the basis for analyzing the poverty impacts 
of the DDA on ten individual countries by way of a dozen case studies. These case 
studies use a variety of innovative techniques to establish the potential impacts of the 
DDA on different household groups and, in some cases, different regions within the 
country. The focus countries are: Bangladesh, Brazil (2 studies), Cameroon, China (2 
studies), Indonesia, Mexico, Mozambique, Philippines, Russia, and Zambia.  
  Some case studies also examine other poverty policies in addition to trade reforms 
– for example education reform or agricultural extension services. Sometimes these are 
complementary to the Doha Round in the sense of enhancing its effect, but more often 
they are independent. They are explored here as yardsticks against which trade reform 
can be measured and as suggestions as to how governments can seek to overcome any 
adverse poverty effects from the Round. However, we do not subscribe to the view that 
such ‘complementary policies’ are necessary for the Doha Round to be beneficial.   6
1.   Choice of Methodologies  
In organizing the research summarized here, we had two contrasting objectives. 
On the one hand, we wanted the studies to be consistent with one another in order to 
ensure an accurate global assessment of the DDA, as well as comparability across 
studies. On the other hand, research into the poverty impacts of trade reform is new, and 
almost the only consensus it has reached is that countries differ. From this perspective, 
we wanted both to encourage a variety of approaches at the country level and to exploit 
the specific skills and knowledge of case-study authors to gear their country models most 
closely to local characteristics and issues.
2  
The project, therefore, is a composite in which the global analysis – the 
methodology for deriving the global findings and passing them over to the national case 
studies – is unique and consistent with current standards in the field of quantitative trade 
policy analysis, while the country case studies display a wide range of methodological 
innovations and topical design features. This variety has been fruitful, with different 
country studies emphasizing alternative links between trade and poverty and providing a 
diversity of insights. Nevertheless, as a check and in order to permit us to draw some 
broader conclusions, we have included two more uniform exercises: first, a 15 country 
cross-section analysis, in which a common, fully integrated trade-poverty analysis is 
provided for a range of developing countries. Second, we have included a global analysis 
of aggregate poverty impacts derived by applying simple poverty elasticities to the 
predicted outcomes for developing countries in a global simulation of a prospective Doha 
agreement. 
                                                 
2 The forthcoming book on Globalization and Poverty, Harrison (2005), adopts the same strategy, 
combining a set of cross-country econometric studies with several individual country case studies.   7
  The prevailing methodology in the research is Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) analysis. This is the dominant methodology for the ex ante analysis of the 
economic consequences of comprehensive trade agreements – be they multilateral or 
bilateral in nature (Shiells and Francois, 1994). The reason for this dominance is that no 
other approach offers the same flexibility for looking at prospective changes in trade 
policy, while respecting the fundamental economy-wide consistency requirements such 
as balance of payments equilibrium and labor and capital market constraints that are so 
important in determining the consequences of comprehensive trade reforms. The CGE 
approach has come under substantial criticism (e.g., from Jorgenson, 1984; McKitrick, 
1998; Kehoe, 2005) for having insufficient econometric underpinnings, and for not being 
adequately validated. Accordingly, in this project we offered a number of econometric-
based analyses that focus on key dimensions of the trade and poverty question, including: 
price transmission from the border to households, cropping choices by farm households, 
labor market participation decisions, and the intersectoral movement of labor. In addition, 
when we assess the global market impacts, we use a CGE model based on the most recent 
econometric evidence on supply and demand elasticities and for which some (modest) 
validation has been undertaken. 
  The majority of the studies in the project and summarized here are based on 
comparative static analysis. Thus the authors abstract from the impact of trade reform on 
investment and productivity and therefore economic growth. There are two reasons for 
this emphasis. First, most of the issues that arise in the popular debate over the poverty 
impacts of trade policy are fundamentally comparative static in nature. Concerns about: 
the urban poor being adversely affected by higher food prices, the potential loss of jobs   8
by women in the apparel sector, or the poverty impacts on low income farmers in 
developing countries are all questions about the redistributive impact of trade policy 
reform. To answer them one needs a disaggregated, comparative static framework. Of 
course, we are also keenly interested in the potential for economic growth to alleviate 
poverty, and five of the studies utilize and dynamic framework that accounts for the 
growth effects of changes in investment deriving from trade policy reform. However, 
quantifying the impact of trade reform on growth and poverty through channels such as 
the effect on productivity or the benefits of increasing the range of available goods 
remains a lively topic for current research on which consensus has yet to emerge.  Hence 
our second reason for using the comparative static approach is to avoid any appearance of 
overstating the poverty alleviating benefits of liberalization.  
In the end, it must be said that this project has proven to be a very ambitious 
undertaking – attempting to bridge micro-based research focusing on the choices and 
opportunities facing individual households in developing countries with macro-based 
research on the global impacts of multilateral trade policy reform. The payoff to this 
exercise must be judged by the insights offered. And it is to these that we now turn. 
 
2.    The Global Impact of the Doha Agenda  
Kym Anderson and Will Martin (2005) take as its starting point the July WTO 
Framework Agreement for the Doha Agenda. It explores the issues flowing out of this 
document – and in particular the annexes dealing with export subsidies, domestic support 
and market access in agriculture, as well as market access for non-agricultural goods. It 
examines seven different Doha scenarios, of which we adopt one as the core scenario for   9
the project. In constructing this scenario, the authors have taken considerable care to 
distinguish those trade reforms that are actually being negotiated under the Doha 
Development Agenda from those that have already been agreed to previously. This 
distinction is complicated by the fact that virtually all of our policy data bases pre-date 
completion of the Uruguay Round Agreement. In fact, the starting point for all of the 
analysis in this project is the year 2001 – the most recent one for which comprehensive 
data are available for tariffs, domestic support and export interventions. Therefore, prior 
to constructing the Doha scenario, a “pre-experiment” is undertaken in order to account 
for the major developments in trade policy since 2001. These include: tariff reforms 
undertaken by newly acceding WTO members – most notably China, the phase-in of 
remaining Uruguay Round commitments by developing countries, EU enlargement to 25 
countries, and the abolition of export quotas on textiles and apparel under the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing.  Thus, even though the full impact of some of these reforms is 
yet to be felt, the analysis in this project looks beyond these reforms, envisioning a global 
economy in which they have been fully implemented, and focusing on the further impacts 
of trade liberalization undertaken in the context of the Doha negotiations.  
The most important finding from Anderson and Martin (2005) is that, unless the 
Doha Agenda is considerably more ambitious than the Uruguay Round in terms of depth 
of cuts in bound tariffs and domestic support, it will achieve little development stimulus. 
The main problem on the market access side is binding overhang. For example, in 
agriculture – one of the key areas of the Doha Agenda with respect to trade and poverty – 
bound tariffs in developing countries average 48% while applied tariffs average are only 
21%. In the case of the least developed countries, the respective figures are 78% and   10
13%! Even in the EU (21% binding vs. 12% applied) and USA (6% binding vs. 3% 
applied) there is substantial binding overhang in agriculture. So for many 
countries/products, bound tariffs can be cut deeply with no impact on applied protection 
and hence international trade.   
In the central Doha scenario featured in our project, agricultural tariffs are cut 
using a tiered formula, with marginal cuts changing at 15 and 90 percent bound tariff 
rates. The marginal cuts are 45 percent for the lowest agricultural tariffs, 70 percent for 
tariffs in the middle range and 75 percent marginal cuts for the highest tariffs.
3 For 
developing countries, the inflection points are placed at 20, 60 and 120 percent bound 
tariff levels in agriculture, with marginal cuts of 35, 40, 50 and 60 percent, respectively. 
In non-agriculture, tariffs are subjected to proportional cuts of 50 percent for developed 
and 33 percent for developing countries. The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are not 
required to cut tariffs under this central scenario. Box 1 summarizes our central Doha 
scenario. 
There is much more to the DDA than just agriculture and non-agricultural market 
access – for example, trade facilitation, services liberalization and rules on anti-dumping 
and regionalism. We focus on the former issues partly because they are quantifiable and 
provide a large agenda in themselves. Mainly, however, they are likely to be the major 
issues both in terms of effects and in terms of negotiators’ need for detailed quantitative 
advice. Moreover, the other issues are basically additive to the analysis of market access 
for goods, so that as their outcomes and consequences become clear they may be added to 
our results to get an overall picture. 
                                                 
3 For example, a tariff of, say, 100% is cut by 66.95%: = [15%*0.45 + (90-15)%*0.70 + (100-90)%*0.75]. 
By applying the cuts at the margin we avoid the discontinuities implied by the July Framework.   11
As a consequence of the relatively ambitious tariff cuts we analyze, average 
world-wide tariffs for all merchandise trade drop from 4.7% in the baseline to 3.2%. This 
masks rather different cuts for countries at different income levels. High income 
countries’ tariffs fall from 2.9 to 1.6%, middle income countries’ tariffs from 7.2 to 6.3% 
and low income tariffs (including LDCs which do not cut tariffs at all) from 15.6 to 
14.6%. (Anderson and Martin report these cuts on a more detailed basis in their paper.) 
In the case of domestic support, there is also a problem of bound vs. applied 
protection, with bindings generally much higher than applied Aggregate Market Support 
(AMS). But even more severe is the definition of the AMS itself – in particular its 
reliance on administered prices as a benchmark. This feature makes it possible for 
administrators in some countries to bring programs into WTO compliance with the stroke 
of a pen – simply by abolishing the administered price! The core Doha scenario assumes 
that industrial countries with domestic support in excess of 20 percent of production cut 
their bound AMS commitments by 75 percent, while others cut by 60 percent. 
Developing countries are assumed to cut their AMS by 40 percent. Even with these 
ambitious reductions, only six WTO members would be required to reduce actual 
support, based on 2001 notifications: Australia, EU, Iceland, Norway, Thailand and USA.  
Export subsidies are the one area where bold cuts (full elimination) are on the 
table, but these have diminished in importance over time. At present, they remain a 
significant factor only in the case of the EU (and in the US for dairy products) – and the 
abolition of export subsidies has been made conditional on equivalent treatment of food 
aid and state-trading. Preliminary estimates suggest that reform of the latter two items 
will have little impact, but the linking of these features to the WTO negotiations makes   12
the whole process much more complex. Our central Doha scenario assumes export 
subsidies are abolished. 
In addition to this central Doha scenario, we also consider an important variant in 
which developing countries fully reciprocate the tariff cuts made by developed countries, 
thereby eliminating one of the historical pillars of Special and Differential Treatment. 
The rationale for considering this alternative, which we label Doha-All, will become clear 
when we discuss the results of the global poverty analyses below. Under Doha-All, 
average merchandise tariffs in the middle and low income countries drop further – to 5.6 
and 13.4 percent, respectively. In the case of the low income countries this represents a 
larger incremental cut in average tariffs than was achieved in the central Doha scenario 
itself. Finally, we also explore on occasions a Full liberalization (Full Lib) scenario in 
which all explicit trade policy barriers identified in the database are abolished. 
Assuming that negotiators do indeed honor their initial vision as set forth in Doha 
and make significant cuts in agricultural and non-agricultural protection, what impact 
might this have on poverty? Will they really put Development squarely into the Doha 
Agenda? We turn next to the studies that endeavor to answer this question. 
  We begin with the impact of the Doha reforms on world market prices. Thomas 
Hertel and Maros Ivanic (2005) utilize a global computable general equilibrium model to 
assess the potential impact on world market prices and trade volumes. As established in 
Anderson and Martin (2005), agricultural protection is central to any assessment of 
global trade reform and the global analysis in this study bears this out. The trade reform 
scenarios invariably have the biggest impact on prices and trade volumes for farm and 
food products, followed by textiles and apparel. Given the predominance of the poor in   13
rural areas and their heavy reliance on unskilled wages elsewhere, these are the key 
industries when it comes to any poverty assessment. The strongest world price increases 
are for the heavily subsidized farm products: rice and other grains, cotton, dairy products 
and beef.  The ranking of the price rises arises from the composition of cuts – both across 
the three sets of agricultural distortions and across countries. The other important point 
made in this paper is that, given the increasingly differentiated nature of traded products, 
there is no one “world price” and careful attention must be paid to bilateral patterns of 
trade and country-specific price changes.  
Finally, Hertel and Ivanic outline the methodology for transmitting the generated 
price and volume changes to the national case studies. This turns out to be quite complex, 
and represents an important innovation in the linking of global economic outcomes with 
national impacts.  
 
3. Price  Transmission    
Our analysis of the country case studies is structured around the conceptual 
framework laid out by Winters (2002) and Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004). This 
begins with the question of price transmission – namely how much of the world price 
shock is transmitted to producers and consumers?  
With a majority of the poor in most countries located in rural areas – often poorly 
served by transportation and communication infrastructure, it is important to ask whether 
developments in global markets will really have an impact on these households. Of 
course, this is an empirical question, subject to econometric investigation, and this is 
precisely what Alessandro Nicita (2004) does in the case of Mexico. He shows that   14
indeed world prices are differentially transmitted to the regions of the country, depending 
on their distance from the border and the nature of the commodity in question. He begins 
his analysis by examining the extent of “pass-through” from international prices to 
domestic prices at the border. Here, he finds that for manufactured goods, about two-
thirds of the international price change passes through to the domestic market, whereas 
the comparable figure for agriculture is just one-quarter.  
Nicita’s econometric estimates also show that the transmission of world market 
price changes diminishes with distance from the border. In addition, urban areas are more 
sensitive to border prices changes, when compared to rural areas. Therefore, he concludes 
that in the more remote, rural regions of Mexico, very little of the international price 
changes will be felt – particularly in the case of agricultural products. As a consequence, 
the impact of the Doha scenarios – which have only modest impacts on world prices, 
anyway – are negligible in rural Mexico, except in the North, near the US border, where 
rural households see some small gains. Urban consumers face higher food prices and a 
small decline in unskilled wages as the privileged Mexican position in the US market is 
eroded by MFN tariff cuts. Thus the urban poor experience small losses.  
Nicita (2005) also explores the impact of complementary domestic reforms that 
might permit rural producers to respond to improved world market conditions without 
incurring additional costs (e.g., a productivity gain or the employment of surplus labor). 
This enhances the welfare outcome for rural households in all regions excepting the 
South. Rural households in the South benefit from Doha only when the reforms are 
accompanied by enhanced price transmission – e.g., through improved transport and   15
market infrastructure. So there is an important interaction between price transmission and 
the distribution of gains from global trade reforms.  
One of the poorest countries in the world, which also has very poor infrastructure 
and is plagued by high domestic marketing costs, is Mozambique. In fact, recent work by 
Arndt et al. (2000) estimates producer-consumer margins as high as 300% (for cassava). 
The biggest margins reported in their study are for food products, which tend to dominate 
both the consumption and production bundles of the poor. So the existence and behavior 
of these margins is critically important for any poverty study. Channing Arndt (2005) 
explores this issue in the context of the Doha Round scenarios for Mozambique. As with 
the Mexico study, the combination of these marketing margins with modest world price 
changes means that the impact on household welfare in Mozambique is quite small. 
Indeed, about one-third of rural households are unaffected by the Doha scenario. The 
largest rural losses are about one percent of income, with some households experiencing 
modest gains. The dispersion among urban households is larger, due to the presence of 
smaller marketing margins. Overall the impact of multilateral trade reform on 
Mozambique is adverse, as preferences are eroded and prices of imports rise.  
 
4.  The Disaggregated Impact on Households  
  Moving beyond the question of price transmission, we come to the issue of 
household level impacts of – and household responses to – the price changes ensuing 
from trade reforms. The simplest way of exploring this link is to focus on a single 
commodity. This is the approach taken by Jorge Balat and Guido Porto (2005) on the 
impact of trade reform on cotton producers in Zambia. They note that the critical factor in   16
this case is the share of household income generated by cotton production. To a first-
order approximation, the real income impact of a change in the price of cotton may be 
obtained by multiplying this income share by the percentage change in cotton price. This 
leads them to focus on the evolution of cotton income shares amongst the poor in 
Zambia. Since cotton is grown in significant quantities only in three provinces, this is 
where they focus attention. 
  One of the striking things about world cotton markets in the late 1990s was the 
collapse in world prices. Between 1996 and 1998, cotton prices in Zambia fell by 20 
percent. Therefore, it is surprising that cotton’s share in income among the poor rose 
sharply in the Eastern and Southern Provinces over this same period. Indeed, amongst the 
poorest households in the Eastern Province, the increase was nearly five-fold – even as 
the income share fell for wealthier households. While there are many factors that may 
bear on this change, the authors argue that the most likely reason was the reform of the 
cotton marketing board system and the implementation of an out-grower scheme which 
proved effective in getting seed and fertilizer into the hands of credit-constrained, small 
scale producers. This increase in the cotton share boosts the potential benefits from 
multilateral agricultural reforms, since one of the main consequences of such reform 
would be to raise cotton prices.  
  Despite the increase in cotton income shares over this period, the income impact  
on the poor of higher cotton prices – the authors assume a 12% price rise, based on 
several independent studies of world cotton markets – is still relatively modest (of the 
order of one percent of real income, on average) because the average income share is  
about 8%. This brings them to a discussion of complementary domestic reforms. In   17
particular, they cite evidence from other research they have conducted in Zambia which 
finds that access to extension services can boost productivity by more than eight percent, 
resulting in an aggregate gain of more than nine percent, when combined with higher 
cotton prices.  
But the largest poverty reduction benefits appear to arise when subsistence 
households switch to cotton production in the wake of increased demand for exports. 
Here, a careful matching of subsistence and cotton-producing households shows that, all 
else constant, subsistence producers could boost their incomes by nearly 20 percent if 
they switched to cotton production. Such a switch would be greatly facilitated by 
continued improvement of the out-grower schemes and strong demand for cotton exports. 
When combined with improved extension services and higher cotton prices, the switch 
from subsistence production to cotton could boost incomes of some of the poorest 
households in Zambia by nearly one-third. In sum, Balat and Porto conclude that trade 
reform alone is not sufficient to raise a large number of poor out of poverty in Zambia, 
but that when the market opportunities presented by trade reforms are combined with 
complementary domestic reforms, significant headway in the fight against poverty is 
possible. 
  Of course, global trade reforms do not simply alter one single commodity price: 
rather they potentially affect all prices in the economy – including the prices of non-
tradeable commodities and services as well as wages and returns to land and capital. So 
we turn next to a study that seeks to account for the full range of price impacts at a highly 
disaggregated level. The unusual thing about Joaquim Ferriera Filho and Mark 
Horridge’s (2005) paper is the very large number of individuals considered in their   18
analysis – 264,000 adults who are members of 112,000 households spread across the 27 
regions of Brazil. The authors argue that the regional dimension of their study is critical, 
given the tremendous disparities in income and poverty incidence across regions. The 
proportion of poor households ranges from about 14% in parts of the Southeast, to nearly 
60% in the North (Amapa). When combined with large variations in industrial 
composition across regions, there is a recipe for great differences in poverty impacts due 
to trade reform. 
  Ferriera Filho and Horridge find that the Doha scenarios benefit agriculture at the 
expense of industry. This is no surprise, as virtually all previous studies of global 
agricultural trade reform have concluded that Brazil would be a substantial beneficiary 
from such a development. However, the real question is: Which households within Brazil 
will benefit? Many believe that all of the benefits will go to large farmers, thereby 
worsening the income distribution in Brazil. The research reported in this paper argues 
that, when one takes account of the additional employment generated by the expansion of 
agriculture and related industries in many of the poorer states of Brazil, the largest 
gainers are actually the households most heavily reliant on low-skill labor. As a 
consequence, the income distribution in Brazil improves under the Doha scenario. This is 
a very important finding. It is a point that has been previously emphasized in more highly 
aggregate research on trade and poverty reported in Harrison et al. (2003). 
As a percentage of initial poverty, the estimated national decline in this paper is 
modest (less than one percent), but it still amounts to a large number of persons. Under 
the Doha scenarios, poverty falls by about 236,000, and it declines by about twice that 
amount in the case of the Full-Lib scenario. The declines in poverty are fueled by the   19
growth in agricultural activity – Brazilian farm and food exports expand strongly in the 
wake of trade reform – and the subsequent increase in demand for the lowest skill 
workers, 41% of whom still work in the farm sector. 
  Of course these wage gains hinge on the existence of an operational labor market. 
Such a market may not exist in some cases and the potential consequences of factor 
market failure are explored in considerable depth in Marijke Kuiper and Frank van 
Tongeren (2005). These authors approach this problem by employing a village-level 
model of a community in Jiangxi Province in China. They capture the heterogeneity of 
household types by grouping them according to their factor endowments. In particular, 
they distinguish whether or not households have access to draught power and whether or 
not they have family members involved in temporary migration outside the province. 
After a detailed analysis of circumstances in this village, they conclude that the markets 
for labor, land and capital are imperfect, thereby preventing households from simply 
taking wages and rental payments as given when making decisions about consumption 
and production. This “non-separability” complicates the household’s decision process 
and can result in some striking results in the wake of trade reforms as the authors show. 
  In the case of Doha reforms, the real income gains for the village are quite modest 
– about 1.2% of income – and relatively evenly spread across the different household 
groups. However, in the case of full liberalization, the aggregate gains are four times as 
large, and also much more unevenly spread across households, with the gains to 
households with draught power nearly twice as large as those for the other household 
groups. This reflects the intensification of production in agriculture engendered by higher 
prices for rice and other farm products.   20
5. Labor  Markets    
The main resource with which the poor are endowed is their own labor. Whether 
they are self-employed farmers, providers of services, or wage earners, their income is 
closely tied to conditions in the labor market. This point surfaces clearly in the Brazil and 
China studies discussed above, both of which emphasize the importance of labor markets 
as a mechanism for transmitting favorable developments in the world marketplace, as 
well as elsewhere in the domestic economy, to impoverished households. We now turn to 
studies which focus primarily on the labor markets in Brazil and China, as well as one 
focusing on a third country – Indonesia. The first of these is Maurizio Bussolo, Johan Lay 
and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2005) on Brazil. Their focus is specifically on the 
link between the farm and non-farm labor forces. They model the decision to move out of 
agriculture based on an econometric model that predicts the likelihood of a given 
individual changing sectors, based on the historical evidence in Brazil. The other 
important feature of this paper is that they set their analysis in the context of a 2001-2015 
baseline for the Brazilian economy. This permits us to view the impacts of trade reform 
in the context of ongoing changes in the economy, labor markets and poverty.  
In their baseline projection, Bussolo, Lay and van der Mensbrugghe find that the 
poverty headcount falls by almost 14%. The majority of this decline is due to poverty 
reduction in agriculture -- a sector which grows considerably faster than the non-farm 
economy under their business as usual (BaU) forecast. The majority of this poverty 
reduction is due to factor price changes (e.g., higher wages), but a significant portion is 
due to the exit of labor from the relatively low wage agricultural sector to higher wage,   21
non-farm jobs. This intersectoral movement is particularly important to the poorest farm 
households. 
Having established this baseline scenario, the authors analyze the implications of 
alternative trade reforms for poverty – and in particular for the different labor force 
groups: the “movers” who move from agriculture to non-agriculture over the course of 
the baseline, the “stayers” who remain in agriculture, and the “stayers” in non-
agriculture. The largest percentage point reduction in poverty over the baseline is for the 
“movers” who experience a 22.4 percentage point reduction in their headcount (down 
from 53.4% to 31%). This is the poorest of the three groups, and it is also the group that 
experiences the greatest incremental poverty reduction, above and beyond the baseline, as 
a result of the Doha trade reforms. Overall, the authors find quite modest poverty gains 
from the Doha scenarios (just 3% of the baseline change over the 2001-2015 period). Full 
liberalization generates estimates of national poverty reduction that are three times as 
large as the Doha reductions – but still modest in the context of projected baseline 
changes. This underscores the fact that trade reforms taken alone are a relatively small 
piece of the overall poverty reduction puzzle. 
Fan Zhai and Thomas Hertel (2005) take a deeper look at the Doha reforms 
through the lens of a labor-focused CGE model of China – and the scope for enhancing 
these outcomes through complementary education reforms. Like the Bussolo et al. paper, 
this paper emphasizes the farm/non-farm labor market linkage which the authors argue is 
partly a function of educational attainment and therefore susceptible to change through 
educational policy. They also emphasize the link between rural and urban labor markets 
in China – through the temporary migration of workers. (Permanent migration is still   22
restricted in that country.) In their analysis of multilateral trade reforms, the authors find 
that poverty falls across all of their household categories: by 1.3% in the case of Doha 
and 2.7% in the case of full liberalization. Inequality also declines slightly under these 
scenarios. 
Zhai and Hertel cite econometric evidence that suggests that an additional year of 
education boosts an individual’s chances of obtaining an off-farm job in China by 14%. 
Educational attainment is also important for workers seeking to meet the needs of an 
increasingly integrated global marketplace. Yet education expenditures per pupil in the 
rural areas lag significantly behind their urban counterparts in China. So the authors 
explore the implications of accompanying trade reform with additional educational 
investments in rural areas to enhance rural labor mobility, productivity and income. In 
particular, they boost expenditures per pupil enrolled in mandatory education by 16% to 
reach the comparable urban level. This increment is assumed to be financed in part by 
public funds, raised through additional taxation, and in part through increased private 
contributions taken out of rural households’ disposable income. This combination of 
educational and trade reforms has a much stronger impact on poverty alleviation, with the 
number of poor (living below $2/day) falling by 13.4%. This scenario also has a 
favorable impact on rural-urban income inequality. 
The final paper focusing on labor markets that we discuss is a case study of 
Indonesia by Anne-Sophie Robilliard and Sherman Robinson (2005). Instead of focusing 
on the farm/non-farm or rural/urban movement of labor, these authors draw a sharp 
distinction between the formal and informal labor markets. The formal sector offers high 
wages, but few opportunities for employment. The informal sector, by contrast, has a   23
flexible wage which is assumed to clear the market. Robilliard and Robinson explicitly 
model each individual’s decision to participate in one or the other of these labor markets. 
In this way, they are able to predict which types of individuals will lose their job when 
formal sector employment contracts, and which will be hired when employment expands. 
These changes in employment represent an important determinant of the welfare impacts 
on households of any change in a country’s pattern of trade, production and employment.  
Robilliard and Robinson explore the poverty impacts of multilateral trade reform 
under three alternative labor market closures: fixed aggregate employment and flexible 
wages, fixed, sector-specific labor (no change in employment by sector), and fixed real 
wages and variable aggregate employment (i.e. changes in unemployment are permitted).  
They focus on the full liberalization scenario for this sensitivity analysis and find that the 
largest reduction in poverty comes from the fixed employment scenario – about 1.4 
million people are lifted out of poverty. The proportional reduction is slightly higher in 
the rural areas and more favorable to the poorest of the poor as well, so that the national 
Gini index falls in this closure. When labor is not permitted to move across sectors, the 
poverty reduction is much smaller – only 900 thousand: because the economy is not 
permitted to fully adjust to the new world prices, efficiency gains are blunted and the 
national rise in per capita income is muted.  
The third case, in which wages are fixed and the unemployment rate is permitted 
to fall in the wake of increasing labor demand, presents a particularly interesting contrast 
in this paper. With increasing aggregate employment, national per capita income rises 
more than in the first case with fixed employment and flexible wages. The authors point 
out that the poverty outcome depends critically on who gets the new jobs. If the new jobs   24
go to individuals from non-poor households, i.e. families with other wage earners or other 
sources of income, the unemployment specification could worsen income inequality since 
the pool of unemployed workers prevents unskilled wages from rising and, without the 
benefit of higher wages, the poverty reduction would muted. In order to quantify this 
outcome, the authors have estimated the likelihood that each type of unemployed 
individual will obtain one of the newly available jobs. There is a considerable uncertainty 
associated with these estimates, and the authors reflect this by reporting their results in 
terms of the mean and standard deviation of a monte carlo simulation for each 
closure/scenario. While the mean poverty reduction under the unemployment closure is 
larger than that under the standard labor market specification, the standard deviations 
suggest that the two are not significantly different in a statistical sense.   
 
6.  Interactions with Tax Policies  
An important theme in many of the papers in our program is the potential for 
interactions between the Doha scenarios and domestic policies to alter the poverty 
outcomes obtained from multilateral trade reform. Does multilateral trade liberalization 
lessen the distortions introduced by domestic commodity and factor market policies, or 
does it exacerbate them? To what extent can complementary reforms of domestic policies 
enhance the degree of poverty reduction?  When trade liberalization results in reduced tax 
revenues, how will this shortfall be made up? Two papers focus squarely on the question 
of tax replacement.
4  
                                                 
4 Of course, some assumption about tax replacement is required in every analysis of trade policy reforms.   25
Christian Arnault Emini, John Cockburn and Bernard Decaluwe (2005) focus on 
the case of Cameroon. They examine the poverty impacts of the central Doha scenario 
paying particular attention to the structure of the domestic tax system and the different 
options available for replacement of the lost tariff revenue. They view the Value-Added 
Tax (VAT) as the most likely tax replacement tool in Cameroon. This tax has a very 
heterogeneous impact on sectors, with effective rates ranging from zero in the case of 
agriculture, to 13% in the case of petroleum refining. When they combine this tax 
replacement tool with the Doha scenario, they find that poverty falls slightly, by about 
22,000 people, in Cameroon, as does inequality. Of course, with relatively small tariff 
cuts under the Doha scenario, tax replacement is not all that central in this scenario.  
In the case of full liberalization, tax replacement becomes much more important 
and the authors consider three alternative tax scenarios in conjunction with these tariff 
cuts. In every case, poverty rises, but the size of the poverty increase, as well as its 
causes, vary with the choice of replacement tax. When they utilize a non-distorting 
production tax, 106,000 people are estimated to be lifted out of poverty, but 193,000 
formerly non-poor fall into poverty, resulting in a net poverty increase of 87,000 people. 
This occurs despite an increase in aggregate welfare in Cameroon, so it is clearly a 
consequence of the pattern of imports and exports in this country. When trade reform is 
coupled with an increase in consumption taxes, the poverty rise is much larger – nearly 
half a million people. This impact is lessened somewhat (a 300,000 increase) by the use 
of the value-added tax to replace the forgone tariff revenue. Clearly in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
The “standard assumption” used is one of replacement of lost tariff revenue with an equi-proportional 
(distribution neutral) income tax. While not a realistic assumption in most cases, it facilitates the 
comparability of results across regions. In those cases where country authors in our program emphasized 
the treatment of the domestic tax system, they were encouraged to explore the impacts of replacing the lost 
tariff revenue with the most likely instrument (usually the value-added tax).   26
Cameroon, the choice of tax instrument used to replace the lost tariff revenue can be as 
important as the type of trade liberalization (full liberalization vs. Doha reforms only). 
A second paper analyzing tax replacement is Caesar Cororaton, John Cockburn 
and Erwin Corong (2005) on the Philippines. This is an interesting case since the 
agriculture sector has evolved from net exporter to net importer over the past three 
decades. As a relatively recent net food importer there is widespread concern in the 
Philippines that trade reforms will jeopardize food security. However, in their analysis of 
the Doha scenarios, the authors find that the national poverty headcount is barely 
affected. There is a small rise in poverty among the self-employed households – 
particularly those in rural areas, while poverty amongst salaried urban workers falls. 
Unlike many of the focus economies in this volume, the Doha reforms are not favorable 
to Philippine agriculture, and this effect is more pronounced under full liberalization. 
Because of the relatively high protection for Philippine agriculture presently, full 
liberalization results in a contraction of the agricultural sector and an increase in rural 
poverty. This is offset by a reduction in poverty amongst the urban population, where 
wages rise. As a consequence, there is a small decline in the national poverty headcount. 
However, when the authors switch from the VAT to a uniform income tax for purposes of 
tariff replacement, poverty rises under the full liberalization case. Once again, the pattern 
of exemptions in the indirect tax system favors the poor, and its use for purposes of tax 
replacement is a critical piece of the poverty puzzle. 
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7. Cross-Country  Comparisons  
With their differences in factor market closures, elasticities of substitution,   
methodologies for grouping households and modeling labor markets, etc., the country 
case studies described up to this point have been non-comparable.   This makes it difficult 
to generalize on the basis of cross-country comparisons. Therefore we included two 
cross-country studies in the program: first, Maros Ivanic (2005) which provides a cross-
country comparison for 15 countries – each of which is treated in a symmetric manner. 
While this approach is somewhat stylized, and therefore less definitive for any given 
country, each of the focus country data bases has been built up from the same types of 
individual household surveys as the single country case studies. Another virtue of this 
paper is that is offers a fully integrated, global/national/micro modeling approach. In 
particular, Ivanic has augmented the GTAP global CGE model with reconciled data on 
140 disaggregated household groups for each of the 15 focus countries. His grouping is 
based on income specialization, e.g., agriculture-specialized households rely almost 
entirely on agricultural self-employment for their income, and similarly for a wage-
specialized stratum, etc. Because his is a global framework, he can simulate all of the 
trade reform scenarios directly in his model, which also facilitates further decomposition 
of the elements of trade reform and their poverty impacts. 
Ivanic’s findings with respect to the poverty impacts of the Doha Agenda are 
particularly interesting. Specifically, he finds that the Doha trade reform scenarios are not 
as poverty-friendly as the global liberalization scenario. Now, if Doha represented the 
same mix of policy reforms as full liberalization, we would expect both simulations to 
have the same pattern of poverty reduction but with larger cuts under Full-Lib because of   28
its deeper cuts in protection (e.g., 100% vs. 33%). However, this is not the case, and, in a 
decomposition analysis, Ivanic shows why.  
The Doha Agenda as outlined by Anderson and Martin (2005) has a variety of 
different elements, and these have conflicting impacts on poverty. The removal of export 
subsidies in the EU and the USA tends to raise poverty in most of the developing 
countries in Ivanic’s sample – even while reducing poverty amongst the agricultural 
households in these poorer countries. This is hardly surprising in light of earlier studies 
highlighting the vulnerability of low-income, net food importing countries to higher 
world prices for these products (e.g., Valdes and McCalla, 2004).
5 Since these export 
subsidies are fully removed under the Doha scenario, this impact is fully realized under 
that partial reform. On the other hand, Ivanic finds that cuts in developing country tariffs 
as a group have a very favorable impact on national poverty in the focus countries.
6 Yet 
there is very little reform of developing country tariffs under Doha – firstly due to limited 
reciprocity (part of Special and Differential Treatment), and secondly due to the 
extensive binding overhang in developing countries. Thus, while developing country 
tariff cuts are among the most poverty-friendly elements of global trade reform, very little 
of the beneficial impact of these reforms is felt under the Doha scenario. When 
combined, these facts explain why Doha is less poverty-friendly than the comprehensive 
reform scenario. It accentuates those aspects of reform that adversely affect poverty 
(export subsidies), while largely omitting those aspects that benefit the poor. 
                                                 
5 Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney (2004) demonstrate that many developing countries have become much 
more heavily dependent on imports of subsidized crops from OECD countries over the past 40 years. 
Removing these subsidies will obviously have an adverse effect in the near term. 
6 In Ivanic’s analysis most of these gains come from improved market access to other developing countries. 
This is due to the relatively high optimal tariff in the underlying GTAP model, which makes unilateral 
reform relatively unattractive (see Hertel and Ivanic, 2005). An implication of this is that to reap the 
benefits developing countries must liberalize together – i.e. that the multilateral aspect of reform is 
important.   29
This suggests that deeper cuts in developing country tariffs under the Doha 
scenario might have a beneficial impact on the poverty outcome. This is explored under 
the alternative scenario, Doha-All, in which developing countries fully reciprocate the 
developed country reductions in tariff bindings. Ivanic shows that Doha-All does indeed 
have a more favorable poverty outcome than the base Doha scenario.  
An additional finding from Ivanic’s cross-section analysis pertains to the common 
assumption that “a rising tide lifts all boats”, i.e., that poverty rises and falls in concert 
with changes in national per capita income. Ivanic shows that this is not always the case 
in the near term. The reason is that trade reform generates uneven gains in the economy. 
One sector gains and another loses, so it matters greatly where the poverty is 
concentrated. If most of the poor reside in agriculture, and agriculture is hurt by trade 
reform, poverty may rise, even if real national income rises. This is the case in Malawi, 
where 40% of the population is specialized in agricultural self-employment.  
    
8.  Effects on Productivity and Economic Growth  
Sustained reductions in poverty require economic growth, which leads naturally 
to the question of how a prospective Doha Development Agenda might affect the growth 
rates of countries currently experiencing the highest levels of poverty. This is a 
challenging area of research – worthy of an entire volume in its own right – but the 
research program contains two country case studies and a global analysis oriented 
towards this theme.   30
Nabil Annabi, Bazlul Khandker, Selim Raiham, John Cockburn and Bernard 
Decaluwe (2005) writing on Bangladesh focus on the growth question by emphasizing 
the impact of trade reform on capital accumulation. It begins with a short run analysis in 
which they find that Bangladesh experiences an aggregate loss, as well as a small rise in 
poverty under the Doha scenario. Previous authors have attributed these adverse 
consequences to two factors. First, Bangladesh is a net agricultural importer and suffers 
from higher world prices agricultural products. Second, as a Least Developed Country 
(LDC), Bangladesh currently enjoys tariff free access into many of the rich country 
markets. When tariffs in these markets fall, she is expected to suffer from “preference 
erosion”, i.e. the value of these tariff preferences diminishes. Our analysis suggests that 
the first explanation is the relevant one – with the main losses associated with imports of 
cotton, wheat and oilseeds. We do not find evidence of preference erosion adversely 
affecting the terms of trade for Bangladesh. This is because the apparel exports displaced 
by erosion from the EU are absorbed in the North American market, where, de facto, 
most apparel exports from Bangladesh do not enjoy preferential market access and so 
Bangladesh benefits from the tariff cuts. The terms of trade losses facing Bangladesh 
under Doha are magnified under full liberalization. In addition to the above, to pay for 
additional imports, Bangladesh must expand the volume of her textile and apparel exports 
– which account for nearly eighty percent of export revenues. This tends to depress their 
prices. 
However, these short run losses are transitory and Annabi et al. estimate that after 
2 – 3 years, the economy will be better off under Full-Lib than under the business as 
usual scenario. The reason is that the cost of investment goods will fall and increased   31
investment will flow to the more competitive sectors, thereby stimulating additional 
growth. They estimate that in the long run (15 years) GDP will be 1.44% higher and 
poverty 6.1% lower under the Full-Lib scenario. A closer look at these results reveals that 
most of the stimulus for the increased investment and economic growth comes from the 
reduction in Bangladesh’s own tariffs, which would be missing under the Doha scenario.  
The authors also briefly explore an issue that has received quite a bit of discussion 
recently in the context of the WTO: remittances from overseas workers. They formally 
explore the implications of a fifty percent increase in the flow of remittances to 
Bangladesh – and specifically to those households currently receiving these transfers. In 
return, the domestic labor supply is reduced. This development has a favorable impact on 
poverty, reducing it by 0.8% in the short run and 4.0% in the long run. To the extent that 
rich countries are concerned about the impact on Bangladesh of higher food prices and 
preference erosion, a policy which permitted increased temporary migration appears to be 
a good way to offset some of these negative effects, as the benefits of increased 
remittances dominate the short run costs of trade liberalization. 
Thomas Rutherford, David Tarr and Oleksandr Shepotylo (2005) explore one of 
the key trade/growth linkages in the case of Russia. They focus particularly on the 
potential for international trade and foreign direct investment in the services sector to 
bring new varieties of goods and new technologies to Russia, thereby enhancing her 
productivity, generating economic growth, and lifting households out of poverty. The role 
of services sector reforms – an important aspect of future WTO agreements – is often 
neglected in analyses of trade and poverty. Yet, as Mattoo et al. (2001) demonstrate, such 
reforms – particularly in telecommunications and financial services, can boost long run   32
growth rates. The paper on Russia begins by analyzing the Doha scenario explored by 
other authors. The impact of this scenario is mixed, but most of the households 
experience a small welfare loss. The Full-Lib scenario shifts the distribution of welfare 
impacts in the positive direction, so that most Russian households now gain and poverty 
falls, but again the changes are quite modest. 
The authors then turn to domestic reforms in the services sectors – a part of the 
economy that the Doha Agenda is not expected to affect to any great degree, but an area 
which is currently receiving a great deal of attention in the context of Russia’s WTO 
accession negotiations. The authors show that the liberalization of barriers to Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) greatly enhances the potential welfare gains. The main vehicle 
for this enhancement is the provision of new varieties of services, which improve 
productivity, not only in the services sector, but also in services-using sectors as well. 
Indeed, the added productivity boost from the elimination of services FDI barriers alone 
is sufficient to generate per capita income increase of 5.3%, ensuring that virtually all 
Russian households benefit from the reform. There are two lessons to be drawn from this 
work. First, productivity growth is essential for generating widespread gains from trade 
reforms, and second, one way of obtaining such growth is through ambitious services 
sector reforms, such as those that have been a part of recent WTO accession negotiations 
– most notably in China, but also now in Russia.
7 
Finally, the program includes an integrated, global analysis of the potential for 
multilateral trade reforms to reduce poverty in the long run (2015). Kym Anderson, Will 
Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2005) utilize the latest version of the 
                                                 
7 Similarly dominant welfare effects from services reforms have been found in the case of China’s WTO 
accession agreement (Walmsley et al., 2005).   33
World Bank’s Linkage model, along with the GTAP data set to project the growth path of 
the global economy from 2001 to 2015. They find that trade reforms have a modest 
impact on capital accumulation and thereby boost the projected global gains from 
multilateral trade reform by about one-quarter. However, they devote most of their 
attention to the potential impacts of increased trade on productivity growth.  (It should be 
noted, however, that the authors focus entirely on productivity growth associated with 
increased manufactures exports – not services trade or investment as with the Russia 
study).  
There is now a rapidly growing literature on the impacts of trade and trade policy 
reforms on productivity and Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe draw on this in 
their paper. When they incorporate the additional impact of openness on labor 
productivity, they find a substantial boost to the global gains (40% larger gains in 2015) 
with a disproportionate share accruing to the South and East Asia developing economies. 
The poverty impacts of these alternative scenarios are elicited by first estimating the 
income gains to the poorest households and then applying to this an estimated elasticity 
of poverty reduction with respect to income growth at the poverty line. Instead of using 
real per capita income for the region as a whole, they use the unskilled wage rate, 
deflated by an index of food and clothing prices, reflecting the dual facts that the main 
endowment of the poor is their own labor, and they spend the bulk of their income on 
non-durable goods. Another critical assumption is that the poor do not pay taxes, so that 
any increase in tax rates required to offset forgone tariff revenues does not affect them.  
Applying these estimates of earnings at the poverty line to the poverty elasticity 
of income in each region – which varies depending on the regional distribution of income   34
– the authors predict the extent of poverty reduction in developing countries. Of course, 
this depends on the poverty line. It also depends on the baseline poverty projections, 
which decline considerably between 2001 and 20015. For $1/day poverty, the estimated 
reduction in 2015, in the absence of additional productivity gains,  is 2.5 million for Doha 
and 31.9 million for Full-Lib. When applied to current (2001) poverty levels, the authors’ 
calculations result in poverty reductions of 9.7 million and 80.5 million under Doha and 
Full-Lib, respectively. The 2015 poverty reductions are increased to 4.3 million and 43.5 
million, for Doha and Full-Lib respectively, when productivity gains are factored in. For 
$2/day poverty, the reduction in number of poor is larger, but the percentage reduction is 
smaller (see Table 1).
8  
Based on the Doha/Full-Lib comparison, it is clear that the (rather ambitious) 
Doha scenarios capture only a relatively small portion of the total poverty reduction 
possible under trade reforms. When the authors consider the Doha-All scenario, they find 
that implementing deeper cuts in the developing countries enhances the poverty outcome, 
nearly doubling the poverty reduction obtained under the central Doha scenario. This 
finding reinforces Ivanic’s (2005) conclusions with respect to the beneficial poverty 
impacts of developing country tariff cuts under the Doha Development Agenda. It is also 
hardly surprising in light of the increasing importance of South-South trade and the 
relatively high level of developing country tariffs as reported by Anderson and Martin 
(2005). 
                                                 
8 These estimates of poverty reduction are considerably smaller than earlier predictions using the World 
Bank’s Linkage model. The difference is due to the fact that these estimates are based on the most recent 
(version 6) GTAP data base, which is further updated to account for EU enlargement as well as the WTO 
accession of China and others. These recent trade reforms have reduced the overall level of protection 
worldwide – thereby lessening the gains from reform. In addition, the version 6 data base has a complete 
treatment of preferential tariffs – including the EU’s 2001 Everything But Arms initiative, which means 
that gains to the least developed countries from trade reform are considerably reduced.   35
Another important finding from the Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
paper relates to sensitive agricultural products, as well as special products in developing 
countries. Industrial countries have proposed that certain sensitive products be exempt 
from steep tariff reductions, instead being liberalized through a combination of quota 
expansion and tariff reduction. Anderson and Martin (2005) suggest that a cut in bound 
tariffs might be most effective, and they consider the case in which these commodities, 
limited to 2% of industrial country tariff lines in agriculture, face a modest 15% cut in 
bound tariffs. In the case of developing countries, an additional category of exemptions is 
provided for in the Framework Agreement. These “special products”, identified “based 
on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs,” will be 
eligible for more flexible treatment as well (WTO, 2004). Allowing for this additional 
category, the scenario outlined by Anderson and Martin permits developing countries to 
exempt 4% of agricultural tariff lines from the tiered cuts, facing instead just a 15% cut in 
bound tariffs.  
Of course it goes without saying that both special and sensitive products 
invariably have the highest tariffs, so that exempting them can make a big difference in 
the results. Indeed, the authors find that merely introducing these modest exemptions for 
a maximum of 2% of the industrial tariff lines in agriculture (4% for developing 
countries) virtually eliminates the poverty impacts of a Doha agreement. Therefore, in 
order to have a significant poverty impact, the Doha Agenda must not only have 
ambitious numerical targets, it must also seek to limit – indeed eliminate – the use of 
sensitive and special product exemptions.
 9 
                                                 
9 We are not arguing here that individual developing countries could not improve their poverty outcomes   36
 
9. Summary  and  Conclusions 
Assessing the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on poverty is a 
challenging assignment. As Winters (2002, p. 43) notes: “Tracing the links between trade 
and poverty is going to be a detailed and frustrating task, for much of what one wishes to 
know is just unknown. It will also become obvious that most of the links are very case 
specific.”  The research reported here is an attempt to make known a few more of these 
“unknown” linkages. As such, the approach has been heterogeneous and opportunistic, 
calling on experts in this field to undertake in-depth studies in countries for which 
appropriate data and analytical infrastructure are available. All of this research capacity 
has been directed towards the analysis of the trade policy question which is central in 
many policy makers’ minds today – namely:  What are the likely poverty impacts of a 
successful Doha Development Agenda? And what elements could be added to enhance 
this outcome? 
  As noted previously, the approach taken by the project ensures consistency of 
methods in the global analysis of the multilateral trade reform scenarios – and also in the 
methodology for incorporating these results into the national analyses. However, at the 
country level, different authors have had the liberty to take a variety of approaches 
depending both on the particular circumstances facing their countries and their own 
analytical interests. This is why we have two studies of the Brazilian economy – one of 
which focuses on near term impacts across heterogeneous individuals, households and 
                                                                                                                                                 
by exempting a few special products from liberalization. But given the multitude of products and countries 
we cannot identify such cases here. Besides, we find it implausible that developing countries could leave 
the exemptions door open in any significant fashion without industrialized countries also squeezing their 
sensitive products through the same opening.    37
regions in Brazil, and one of which focuses on longer terms impacts – particularly in light 
of the barriers to inter-sectoral labor mobility. In the case of China, we have one study 
which focuses on market failure at the village level, and another which focuses on labor 
mobility at the national level. Similarly there are differences in methodology taken across 
countries, with a mix of partial and general equilibrium approaches, and static and 
dynamic frameworks. The base years differ across studies, and even the poverty lines 
chosen are not uniform across all studies. Their findings, therefore, are not strictly 
comparable. Finally, since the choice of countries for the program was made on the basis 
of pre-existing work that laid a foundation for the current research, this is not a random 
sample of developing countries. With these qualifications in mind, let us take an 
overview of the findings. 
Table 1 summarizes the poverty results from each of the national studies (sub-
national studies are not reported here) for both the Doha and Full-Lib scenarios, 
distinguished by length of run for the analysis. The long term studies factor in the impact 
of trade policy on investment and capital accumulation – and in the case of the global 
analysis, productivity as well, whereas the short term studies do not. The national poverty 
changes are reported in two different ways – first as the change in number of persons in 
poverty, and second as the percentage change in the poverty headcount. Thus a negative 
number in Table 1 means that the number of poor has fallen as a result of multilateral 
trade reform, while a positive number indicates that the number of poor has risen.  
  Table 1 suggests several tentative conclusions. First, the near term analyses are 
mixed in their outcomes, with poverty rising in some cases and falling in others. We view 
this diversity as correct and a strength of our country-based approach. Even setting aside   38
the methodological differences between studies, the case-specificity alluded to above 
leads us to expect differences between countries’ interests in the DDA, and in the various 
case studies the authors explain exactly why this is so.  
The largest poverty reductions in Table 1, both in absolute and relative terms, are 
in countries with agricultural export potential to the markets that liberalize most (i.e., East 
Asia and Europe). The strong poverty reduction in Brazil is driven by increased 
agricultural production, which tends to be concentrated in regions with relatively higher 
poverty incidence. In China, the poverty reduction is fueled by increased agricultural 
exports to the highly protected agricultural markets of East Asia. On the other hand, the 
poverty increases tend to be in countries which are net importers of agricultural products 
(e.g., Bangladesh), and which may presently benefit from preferential market access (e.g., 
Mozambique). Thus the strongest difference between countries concerns their exposure 
to the shocks generated by the DDA. Even holding this constant, however, poverty 
impacts can vary with, for example, the degree of transmission of world prices to rural 
households, the barriers to the mobility of workers between sectors of the economy, and 
the incidence of national tax instruments used to replace lost tariff revenue. Taken as a 
whole, the number of countries where poverty declines under the Doha scenario is about 
the same as the number of countries where it falls, although looking at the absolute 
number of poor, we see that poverty declines in several of the most populous countries 
(Brazil, China and Indonesia) and therefore declines overall in this non-random sample of 
countries.   
  Turning to the long run results, we see that all of the studies that consider the 
impact of trade on capital accumulation and/or productivity predict a reduction in poverty   39
(with the exception of Doha-Bangladesh, where there is no long run measurable impact). 
Trade stimulates investment, investment stimulates growth and growth reduces poverty. 
When productivity impacts are also considered (bottom row), this effect is even stronger. 
This short run/long run distinction is particularly striking in the case of the Full-Lib 
scenarios for Bangladesh, where the short run impacts of trade reform translate into a rise 
in headcount poverty, while the long run impacts of trade reform suggest a substantial 
decline. 
In addition to the quantitative summary reported in Table 1, the research program 
has generated a number of additional insights. First, the liberalization targets under the 
DDA have to be ambitious if the round is to have a measurable impact on world markets 
and hence poverty. Second, assuming an ambitious DDA, we have seen that the near-
term poverty impacts are likely to be mixed.  
The analysis suggests, however, that countries can enhance the impact on poverty, 
by pursuing complementary domestic reforms to enable households to take advantage of 
market opportunities created by the DDA.
10 These include improved infrastructure and 
the reform of domestic marketing institutions to improve price transmission to rural 
areas, rural education reform to enhance labor mobility between the farm and non-farm 
sectors, and extension outreach to permit farmers to take advantage of new export 
opportunities opened up by the DDA.  
Of course, sustained poverty reduction depends on stimulating economic growth. 
Here, the impact of the DDA on productivity is critical. Empirical evidence suggests that 
increased merchandise trade will likely bring with it productivity gains through 
                                                 
10 The volume edited by Harrison reaches a similar conclusion, based on a set of ex post analyses of trade 
reform and poverty.   40
disciplinary effects of import competition on domestic firms as well as, possibly, 
learning-by-doing on the export side. To fully realize potential productivity gains, 
however, trade reforms need to be far reaching and should include reducing barriers to 
services trade and investment in addition to merchandise tariffs which lie mainly or 
wholly outside the DDA. Thus even if the DDA is very successful, a major agenda of 
unilateral reform and further rounds of multilateral talks remains. Only through such 
comprehensive reforms can long term growth and poverty reduction be ensured.   41
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Box 1.1  Elements of the DDA Scenario based on July Framework Agreement 
 
• Agriculture: 
− Market access: use non-linear (tiered) formula (as with progressive income tax): 
⋅  For developed: marginal rates (45, 70 and 75%) change at 10, 90% tariffs 
⋅  For developing: marginal rates (35, 40, 50, 60%) change at 20, 60, 120% tariffs 
⋅  LDCs: no cuts to tariffs 
− Aggregate Measure of Support: apply tiered formula: 
⋅  For developed: marginal rates of 60% (AMS less than 20%) and 75% 
⋅  For developing: marginal rate of 40% 
⋅  LDCs: no cuts to domestic subsidies 
− Export subsidies abolished 
• Non-Agriculture Market Access:  50% cuts in tariffs (33% developing, 0% LDC) 
   45
Table 1. Poverty Impacts of a Prospective Doha Development Agenda  
 
  Change in Poverty Headcount 
Country (Chapter No.)  Near Term: Fixed Capital  Long Term: Investment Impacts 
  Doha  Full-Lib Doha Full-Lib 
  1,000 %  1,000  %  1,000 %  1,000  % 
Bangladesh (15)  38  0.3  1,354  1.1  0  0  -5,758  -4.6 
Brazil (7)  -236  -0.4  -482  -0.8         
Brazil (9)          -380  -1.1  -1,030  -2.9 
Cameroon (12)  -22  -0.4  303  4.8         
China (10)  -4,590  -1.1  -8,271  -2.0  -5,378  -1.3  -11,170  -2.7 
Indonesia (11)  -48  -0.1  -1,384  -3.5         
Mexico (4)  4  0.0  127  1.0         
Mozambique (5)  27  0.3  60  0.6         
Philippines (13)  12  0.0  -7  0.0         
Russia (16)  209  0.9  -122  -0.5        
All Developing (17) 
$1/day: 2001* 
            2015** 
-7,000 
-1,700   -0.3 
-66,300 
-23,800  -3.8 
-9,700 
-2,500  -0.4 
-80,500 
-31,900  -5.1 
$2/day:2001 









Productivity Effects Added*** 
$1/day: 2001 













*Based on percentage changes in 2015, but applied to 2001 poverty headcount. 
**Computed for the year 2015 when the total number of poor is projected to be significantly lower. 
***Productivity gains from increased openness to trade apply to both manufactures and agriculture. 
(Earlier versions only assumed productivity gains in manufactures – see Chapter 17 for details.) 
 